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BALANCING CLASHING SCHOLARS’ ACADEMIC FREEDOMS
Sharona Aharoni-Goldenberg*
Gerry Leisman**
ABSTRACT
The paper analyzes the scope of scholars’ academic freedom
and maintains that it is composed of two pillars. First, inclusion, which
is subject to capacity, equality, and the provision of a pro-educational
academic environment. Second, academic expression, which refers to
teaching and research, freedom of opinion, political participation
outside academia and freedom to receive academic materials.
Scholars’ academic freedom is limited by professional standards and
is subject to the respect of the rights of fellow scholars.
The paper argues that scholars’ academic freedom is not
confined to a scholar-state relation but is also relevant to scholarscholar relations. Hence, scholars’ academic freedom can be breached
by peers, for instance, by firing them on the basis of gender. The paper
proposes three tests for balancing clashing scholars’ academic
freedoms. First, the closer in nature the activity is to academia, the
greater its weight (the relevance test). Second, “seclusion v.
exclusion” test. According to this test, a “seclusive” exercise of
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academic freedom, namely one that does not interfere with peers’
rights, should override an “exclusionary” exercise of academic
freedom, namely one that interferes with peers’ rights. Third, within
academia, activities promoting pluralistic notions should override
contrary endeavors (the virtue test).
Finally, the paper applies its conclusions to a test case—the
Campaign against Israeli academia, also known as the academic
boycott of Israel. It concludes that teaching and research activities,
performed in a seclusive manner that does not advance discriminatory
notions should take priority over non-academic political activities.
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INTRODUCTION

Academic freedom is a pivotal notion in the proper functioning
of higher education institutions. It concerns several parties: scholars,
academic institutions, students, and the general public, all of whom
benefit from the fruits of academia. The literature concerning
academic freedom focuses primarily on scholars’ and institutions’
academic freedom vis-à-vis state interference, while the interrelations
between scholars’ clashing academic freedoms are mostly overlooked.
For instance, Robert Post notes that “[s]cholars rarely need to defend
this autonomy from each other.” 1 Yet, some instances do raise
questions regarding the scope of scholars’ academic freedom and
clashing scholars’ rights. For example, this tension is manifested with
regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has infiltrated
academia as part of a political campaign against Israeli academia
(“Campaign”).2
This paper questions the scope of scholars’ academic freedom
and its limits with relation to opposing academic freedoms in general
and with regard to The Campaign, in particular. The article is divided
into two parts. In Part One, we analyze academic freedom and
conclude that the notion of scholars’ academic freedom is composed
of two pillars—inclusion within academia and academic expression.
We maintain that scholars’ academic freedom is not confined to a
scholar-state relation but is also relevant to scholar-scholar relations
and we advance and suggest three balancing tests for weighing
clashing scholars’ academic freedoms. In Part Two we apply the
conclusions concerning academic freedom to The Campaign. We
review The Campaign and its manifestations, discuss its legitimacy in
view of the clashing academic freedoms and apply the balancing tests
to the Campaign.
Our thesis is that generally, clashing scholars’ academic
freedoms should be weighed against each other using three suggested
balancing tests that are advanced by us. First, the relevance test,
according to which, the closer in nature the activity is to academia, the

Robert Post, Why Bother with Academic Freedom?, 9 FLA. INT’L U.L. REV. 9, 12
(2013).
2
Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel, BOYCOTT,
DIVESTMENT, SANCTIONS, https://bdsmovement.net/pacbi (last visited Aug. 26,
2021).
1
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greater its weight. Second, “seclusion v. exclusion” test. According
to this test, a “seclusive” exercise of academic freedom, namely one
which does not interfere with the rights of others, should take priority
over an “exclusionary” exercise of academic freedom, namely one that
does interfere with peers’ rights. Third, the virtue test, according to
which within academia, activities and expressions promoting
democratic and pluralistic notions should take priority over activities
encouraging contrary principles. Applying these proposed balancing
tests to the Campaign, we conclude that teaching and research
activities, performed in a seclusive manner and advancing democratic
notions, should take priority over non-academic political activities.
This paper offers a novel perspective of the scope and limits of
scholars’ academic freedom—a notion that so far has not received
ample notional consideration. It also provides three novel tests for
balancing clashing civil rights and, in particular, clashing scholars’
academic freedoms. Finally, it assists in better confronting the
Campaign from an ethical and legal perspective.
Some preliminary remarks are required. First, the paper
focuses on the scope of scholars’ academic freedom. Clearly, when
dealing with similar disputes, more rights and interests are relevant,
such as freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and the right to
equality. Yet, the paper is confined to analyzing scholars’ academic
freedom. As part of this analysis other connected rights are
considered, such as academic expression and academic political
activism.
Second, a clash between scholars’ rights may arise all over the
world. Therefore, the paper analyzes the issue mainly from a
theoretical perspective, by implementing international legal
instruments, rather than national law. Yet, references to landmark
cases are provided.
Third, this paper has three primary goals: to assist scholars in
determining the ethical-legal scope of their rights within academia; to
assist academic institutions in applying a normative code of behavior;
and to assist the courts in adjudicating future disputes arising between
scholars.
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PART ONE- THE SCOPE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM

This part examines the relevant scope of academic freedom. It
reviews academic freedom, 3 explores scholars’ academic freedom, 4
discusses the scope of scholars’ academic freedom, and introduces
three tests for balancing clashing scholars’ academic freedoms. 5
A.

Academic Freedom—General

This Section investigates the nature of academic freedom by
referring to international legal instruments, literature, statements of
academic freedom and landmark cases.
We refer to three types of international instruments as a source
for academic freedom. First, conventions: The International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“The Covenant”), 6 and the
United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
(“U.N.E.S.C.O.”) Convention against Discrimination in Education.7
Second, the U.N.E.S.C.O. Recommendation Concerning the Status of
Higher-Education Teaching Personnel.8 Third, declarations, some of
which are general, while others deal exclusively with academic

3

See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.B.
5
See infra Part I.C.
6
See Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 15(1) (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) (displaying that
The Covenant was ratified by 160 countries).
7
Convention against Discrimination in Education, Dec. 15, 1960, 429 U.N.T.S. 93
(entered into force May 22, 1962) (explaining that it was accepted by dozens of
countries, excluding the U.S.A.).
8
U.N. Educ. Sci. & Cultural Org. [UNESCO], Recommendation Concerning the
Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel, UNESCO Doc. 29 C/Res. 11
(1997),
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/--sector/documents/normativeinstrument/wcms_493315.pdf [hereinafter UNESCO
Recommendation]. See also Michele Olivier, The Relevance of Soft Law as a Source
of International Human Rights, 35 COMP. & INT’L L.J. S. AFR. 289, 292-93 (2002)
(noting that recommendations are multilaterally agreed and set common standards).
4
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freedom:9 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights;10 the European
Convention of Human Rights (“E.C.H.R.”);11 The Lima Declaration
on Academic Freedom and Autonomy of Institutions of Higher
Education, instituted by the World University Service; 12 the U.N.
World Declaration on Higher Education for the Twenty-First Century:
Vision and Action;13 the Statement of Principles on Academic
Freedom and Tenure of the American Association of University
Professors,14 and its earlier version—the American Association of
University Professors’ 1915 Statement;15 the Canadian Association of
University Teachers policy statement (2011); and the Magna Charta
Universitatum, all of which were signed by European rectors. 16
Although some of the aspects of academic freedom are specifically
protected by several international law instruments, it generally is not
regarded as a human right per se. Rather, it is mainly perceived as a
“secondary” right of freedom of education, 17 incorporating some
aspects of freedom of expression. 18 The right to education is usually
referred to as the right “to take part in cultural life” and “enjoy the
benefits of scientific progress.”19 The obvious understanding of the
right to higher education refers to students’ rights. Yet, it can be
broadly interpreted as to also encompass scholars’ academic freedom.

9

Jean Galbraith & David Zaring, Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law, 99 CORNELL
L. REV. 735, 751 (2014). Declarations are usually adopted by international bodies,
such as universities; although declaratory and not binding, they serve as soft law,
expressing guiding principles. Id.
10
G.A. Res. 217 A (III), art. 27(1), Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec.
10, 1948).
11
European Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S.
5 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) (amended Aug. 1, 2021).
12
World Univ. Servs., The Lima Declaration on Academic Freedom and Autonomy
of Institutions of Higher Education, (Sept. 1988) [hereinafter The Lima Declaration].
13
World Declaration on Higher Education, Higher Education for the Twenty-First
Century: Vision and Action, *4, U.N. Doc. ED/2005/ME/H/1 (Oct. 9, 1998).
14
1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, in POLICY
DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 3 (AAUP eds., 1984).
15
Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic
Freedom and Tenure, 1 AAUP 291.
16
Magna Charta Universitatum, OBSERVATORY (Sept. 18, 1988),
http://www.magna-charta.org/resources/files/the-magna-charta/english.
17
The Lima Declaration, supra note 12.
18
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
19
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 6, at art. 15(1); see
also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 10.
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John Dewey, an early supporter of academic freedom, indicated that
the idea of the university is to search for the truth, to verify facts in a
critical way and to reach conclusions by the best existing methods in
order to pass this truth to students.20 Scholars are in a constant quest
to enhance their knowledge and participate in the cultural life of the
community.
Scholarship includes the sharing of scientific
advancement and, therefore, incorporates education and the quest for
knowledge and truth. The conclusion that the right to education also
appertains to scholars may also be inferred from the Preamble of the
U.N.E.S.C.O. Recommendation that specifically recalls Article 13(1)
of the Convention against Discrimination in Education, referring to
States Parties’ recognition of the right to education, as its source of
inspiration.21
Education is regarded as a fundamental notion of human rights,
democracy, and development. 22 It is aimed at enabling people to
participate effectively in a free society, strengthen respect for human
rights, promote understanding, tolerance, and friendship among
nations, racial or religious groups and further global peace.23
B.

Scholars’ Academic Freedom

This Section reviews and analyzes the normative sources
concerning academic freedom and concludes that scholars’ academic
freedom is composed of two pillars—inclusion and expression.
1.

The First Pillar of Academic Freedom—
Inclusion

The notion of academic inclusion refers to the right to
participate in the cultural life of the community in terms of research,
education, attending classes, teaching, and writing and membership in

20

JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 122 (Free Press et al. eds., 1944).
21
Convention against Discrimination in Education, supra note 7.
22
World Declaration on Higher Education, supra note 13; see also UNESCO
Recommendation, supra note 8, at art. 10(a)(b).
23
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 10, at art. 26(2).
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professional or representative academic bodies.
Therefore,
international co-operation is granted additional weight in academia. 24
The principle of inclusion is composed of three elements:
capacity, equality, and the provision of a pro-educational academic
environment. First, access to higher education is subject to capacity. 25
While everyone has the right to education, 26 the right to higher
education is accessible to all, based on merits. 27 Capacity is assessed
by expertise and experience. 28
Capacity includes effort and
perseverance,29 that is “evaluat[ed] on academic grounds and primarily
by peers.”30
Second, there is no room for discrimination in granting access
to higher education positions and in academic life. Any non-inclusive
decision that is based on race, religion, politics, national or on social
origin is discriminatory.31 The nondiscriminatory aspects of academic
freedom are not limited to the admission of teaching and research
positions.32 Firing on the grounds of nationality or religion is equally
discriminatory. Thus, for instance, article 46 of the U.N.E.S.C.O.
Recommendation states: “Teachers should be adequately protected
against arbitrary action affecting their professional standing or
career.”33 Arbitrary employment clearly also refers to discriminatory
one.

24

Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 6, at art. 15(4)
(listing the benefits of encouraging developing international contacts); see also
UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 8, at 53-4.
25
See Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 6, at art.
13(2)(c); see also Convention against Discrimination in Education, supra note 7, at
art. 4(a).
26
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 6, at art. 13; see
also European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 11.
27
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 10, at art. 26(1).
28
U.N. Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, CESCR General Comment
No. 13: The Right to Education (Art. 13), Adopted at the Twenty-First Session, UN
Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 (Dec. 8, 1999).
29
See World Declaration on Higher Education, supra note 13, at art. 3(a); see also
UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 8, at 58 (specifically addressing scholars’
right of access to education).
30
J. Peter Byrne, The Social Value of Academic Freedom Defended, 91 IND. L.J. 5,
6 (2015).
31
UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 8, at art. 1(a); see also Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 10, at art. 26.
32
UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 8, at art. 27.
33
Id. § 46.
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Third, a pro-educational environment. A welcoming academic
environment provides an atmosphere promoting speculation and
experiment, as indicated by Judge Powell (majority) in Regents of
University of California v. Bakke.34 As such, academics cannot work
effectively in a hostile learning environment. Further, wisdom and
scientific progress cannot be achieved in a menacing environment or
in an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust. 35 Teaching personnel have
the “right to fulfil their functions without fear . . . of repression from
the State, or from any other source.”36 This may include students
carrying guns,37 political entities that are external to the academic
institutions and student associations.
2.

The Second Pillar of Academic Freedom—
Freedom of Expression

Academic expression is granted special protection from
censorship due to its importance to the development of culture and
science.38 The ad hoc protection that is given to academic expression
is meant to encourage diverse and unorthodox thinking.39 Academia
should facilitate an environment conducive to novel and controversial
ideas and where theories can flourish. Diversity, pluralism, and
openness are essential aspects of academic freedom of opinion.
Freedom of speech is a long-protected constitutional right. 40
Yet, academic freedom of expression differs from general freedom of
expression in two respects. While general freedom of expression is of
greater applicability, as it is not subject to academic scrutiny and not
generally limited in its substance, it is not deserving of special ad hoc

34

438 U.S. 265, 312 (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)).
Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250-63.
36
UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 8, at art. 27.
37
Aurora Temple Barnes, Guns and Academic Freedom, 53 GONZ. L. REV. 45, 8081 (2017) (“[I]f professors do not feel safe conducting uninhibited discussions within
their classrooms, their academic freedom is being infringed.”).
38
UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 8, at art. 12.
39
See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (ruling that the First
Amendment “does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom.”).
40
Declaration of the Rights of Man, art. 11 (France 1789); see also U.S. CONST.
amend. I; see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 10, at art. 19;
see also European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 11, at art. 10(1).
35
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protection from censorship. 41 Academic freedom of expression is of a
narrower application and scope.
As explored below, academic freedom of expression is a
multifaceted concept, composed of four interrelated notions: freedom
of expression in teaching and in research, freedom of opinion, political
participation, and freedom to receive academic materials. 42
Furthermore, the idea of academic freedom of expression is subject to
certain limitations.43
i.

Free Expression in Teaching and
Research

Academic professional expression is manifested in teaching,
discussions, and scholarship, 44 publishing the results of research and
in expressing opinions about the institution. 45
Freedom of academic expression prevents silencing the
expression of opinions. Scholars’ freedom of opinion is specifically
protected under the Convention against Discrimination in Education, 46
and by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural

41

UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 8, at art. 26 (referring to the protection of
scholars’ general rights as citizens); see also, Magna Charta Universitatum, supra
note 16 (referring to academic freedom in teaching).
42
Infra Part I.B.2.(a)-(d).
43
Infra Part I.B.2.(e).
44
Byrne, supra note 30, at 8. Byrne concluded that there is a “sharp distinction
between the protections offered by the First Amendment to a faculty member’s
speech outside their scholarship, and the role of academic freedom in protecting the
truth values of scholarship.” Id.
45
UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 8, at art. 27, 29; see also NELLY P.
STROMQUIST, TWENTY YEARS LATER: INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO PROTECT THE
RIGHTS OF HIGHER EDUCATION TEACHING PERSONNEL REMAIN INSUFFICIENT,
EDUCATION INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH, 12 (2017). Stromquist reads the UNESCO
Recommendation as referring to four pillars:
(1) The right to teach; (2) the right to engage in research and disseminate
their work [including the right to write and teach ideas considered of
relevance to society]; (3) the right to engage in service to the profession
and the institution, including the right to criticize the institution and the
system in which one works (intramural speech); and (4) the right to
exercise one’s civil liberties without institutional reprisal or censorship.

Id.
46
Convention against Discrimination in Education, supra note 7, at art. 1(1)(a).
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Rights, which requires neutrality towards the content of academic
expression.47
ii.

Freedom of Opinion in Academia

Academic freedom of expression encompasses the right to hold
opinions, an earlier stage of expression. Questioning, exploring new
ideas, and diversity of thought and opinion are essential elements of
academic inquiry. Freedom of opinion includes the right to hold a
controversial idea without fear of punishment, shaming or
discrimination.
There is a substantial body of judicial decisions indicating that
academic freedom includes the freedom to participate in academia
regardless of opinions. In Healy v. James,48 the Court ruled that, “[t]he
college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the
‘marketplace of ideas,’ and we break no new constitutional grounds in
reaffirming this Nation’s dedication to safeguarding academic
freedom.”49 Similarly, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents,50 it was held
that, “[t]he Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out
of a multitude of tongues, (rather) than through any kind of
authoritative selection.”51 In Sweezy v. New Hampshire,52 the plurality
ruled that exposing past political associations and questioning the
content of university lectures through compulsory disclosure violated
the right to due process and constituted an invasion of liberty in
academic freedom and political expression.53
Provided that it adheres to professional standards, an academic
opinion, even if controversial, may not serve as an entrance barrier to
academia. This stance is true, both to academic and general opinions.
One may hold political, religious, or other ideas, and they should not
interfere with one’s academic freedom.

47

Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 6, at art. 2(2);
contra, UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 8, at art. 26 (referring to freedom of
opinion as a general human right to be preserved).
48
408 U.S. 169 (1972).
49
Id. at 180-81.
50
385 U.S. 589 (1967).
51
Id. at 603.
52
354 U.S. 234 (1957).
53
Id. at 250.
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Political Participation

The international instruments dealing specifically with
political freedom of academics address the notion of
nondiscrimination of scholars based on political opinions.54 The
U.N.E.S.C.O. Recommendation deals with the right to have a political
position outside of academia (“political participation”)55 and with
scholars’ rights to undertake professional activities outside their
employment for the application of their knowledge to the community’s
problems.56
The World Declaration on Higher Education encourages
academic activism by “disseminat[ing] universally accepted values,
including peace, justice, freedom, [and] equality.” 57 It grants the right
to enjoy academic autonomy and freedom, conceived as a set of rights
and duties, while being held accountable to society. 58 It further grants
the right to participate in issues affecting the well-being of nations.59
iv.

The Right to Seek and Receive
Academic Materials

Academic freedom of expression includes the right to seek and
receive information. Several covenants and declarations refer to this
right, as part of freedom of expression. 60 In particular the American
Association of University Professors addresses the need to deal with
the sources of knowledge.61
The right to receive information is associated with freedom of
opinion. An essential element of forming an opinion is access to
information and exposure to ideas and scholars’ fruits of knowledge.

54

Convention against Discrimination in Education, supra note 7, at art. 1(1)(a).
UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 8, at art. 26 (“Higher-education teaching
personnel, like all other groups and individuals, should enjoy those internationally
recognized civil, political, social and cultural rights applicable to all citizens.”).
56
Id. at art. 30.
57
World Declaration on Higher Education, supra note 13, at art. 2(d).
58
Id. at art. 2(e).
59
Id. at art. 2(f).
60
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 19(2) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 10, at art. 19; European Convention on
Human Rights, supra note 11, at art. 10.
61
1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, supra note 15.
55
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Sweezy refers to this notion as the right of inquiry, “[t]eachers and
students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate,
to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise, our civilization
will stagnate and die.”62
In order to fulfill their right of inquiry, scholars need access to
papers, books, fruits of research, and attend conferences. This includes
information generated in classrooms, libraries, research institutes,
databases, substances, and materials.
Access to open-source
information and material must also be granted to all scholars. 63 The
information should not be censored. Regard should also be given to
access the fruits of scholarship. 64
v.

Limits to Academic Freedom of
Expression

Despite its great importance, the special academic freedom of
expression is restricted in several ways. First, it is confined to
academia such as classroom, laboratory, publication, and research. It
is therefore intramural rather than extramural. Lawrence White noted
that the courts are more willing to protect claims of academic freedom
when they arise in intra-mural circumstances, than when they do not
relate to teaching and research. 65 Second, the special protection
afforded to academic expression is limited to professional expression,
as it is subject to scrutiny, professional standards, intellectual rigor,
scientific inquiry, and research ethics.66 This notion means that
academic publishing rights are not automatic, they are subject to peer
review, for instance. Byrne points out that academic freedom of
expression differs from that of the general public, as faculty can be
penalized when peers judge their scholarship or teaching for falling
below professional standards. 67 Further, teaching is subject to
scientific evaluations. Truly, the scope of scholars’ freedom of
academic speech is not a clear-cut notion. White noted that academic
freedom remains ill-defined as a jurisprudential principle guiding

62

Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 8, at art. 22.
64
Id.
65
Lawrence White, Fifty Years of Academic Freedom Jurisprudence, 36 J. COLL. &
UNIV. L. 791, 828 (2010).
66
UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 8, at art. 29.
67
Byrne, supra note 30, at 6-7.
63
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courts in the adjudication of disputes between faculty members and
academic institutions.68 Yet there is a clear difference between general
freedom of expression and academic freedom of expression—the latter
being restricted to professional expertise. Hence, academic freedom
of expression does not cover political utterances or incivilities. 69 In
this regard, academic freedom of expression is a shield, not a sword.
It is not a safe harbor for general political or other non-professional
expressions.
Third, regard should also be given to limits on academic
freedom of expression when this right interferes with the rights of other
scholars. Academic freedom of expression is subject to the respect of
the rights of fellow scholars and to the duty to ensure respect for
contrary views.70
3.

The Scope of Scholars' Academic Freedom—
Conclusions

The review of the normative sources concerning academic
freedom leads to the conclusion that academic freedom is composed
of two pillars. The first pillar concerns inclusion. Universities are the
marketplace of ideas. In order to facilitate an interchange of thoughts
and findings, academic freedom must be interpreted as a means to
keeping the gates of academia inclusive. The notion of academic
inclusion is composed of three elements. First, academic capacity,
rather than irrelevant admission factors. Second, equality rather than
racial or national discrimination. Third, the provision of a proeducational academic environment, rather than a hostile teaching
environment. The second pillar of academic freedom concerns
academic expression, referring to freedom of expression in teaching
and research, freedom of opinion, political participation outside
academia and freedom to receive academic materials.

68

See White, supra note 65, at 842.
See Sharona Aharoni-Goldenberg et al., Repercussions of Incivility and Hostile
Expressions in Academia: A legal Perspective, 12 INDUS. & ORGANIZATIONAL PSYC.
385, 387 (2019).
70
See UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 8, at 60 (“Higher-education teaching
personnel should recognize that the exercise of rights carries with it special duties
and responsibilities, including the obligation to respect the academic freedom of
other members of the academic community and to ensure the fair discussion of
contrary views.”).
69
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We further conclude that academic freedom is denied when
scholars are socially shunned, boycotted or intimidated for irrelevant
reasons, such as race, religion, or political opinions by fellow scholars
or the academic institutions. At times, a single act will not constitute
a barrier to academic access. However, the cumulative effect of certain
individual activities may result in a breach of academic freedom. We
hold that for example, the systematic shunning or frightening of certain
scholars may amount to a breach of their academic freedom as they de
facto impede freedom of opinion.
The various sources discussed above lead to the conclusion that
academic freedom confers special rights upon scholars but also comes
with obligations and is not unlimited. Academic freedom is thus
restricted by several considerations. First, academic expression is
limited by professional standards, does not cover political utterances
or incivilities, and applies intramurally. Second, it is subject to the
respect of the rights of fellow scholars and to the duty of ensuring
respect for contrary views. Third, it is also limited by basic principles
and considerations of equality and nondiscrimination referring to
fellow scholars.
C.

Clashing Scholars’ Academic Freedom—
Discussion

This Section discusses the scope of scholars’ academic
freedom, reviews its various beneficiaries, explores the diversity of
potential entities interfering with it, and proposes balancing tests for
dealing with clashing scholars’ academic freedoms.
1.

The Secondary Beneficiaries of Scholars’
Academic Freedom

The goal of academia is not confined to the personal
development of the scholar at hand. In Sweezy, it was stressed that
academic freedom is meant to benefit the general public, and that
interference with academic freedom might “imperil the future of our
Nation.”71 Similarly, Justice Brennan noted in Keyishian that, “[o]ur
Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which

71

Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
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is of transcendent value to all of us . . . .”72 Academic freedom
concerns several parties: scholars, the academic institution, students,
and the general public whose interest it is to enjoy the fruits of
academia. The interpretation of the scope of academic freedom should
therefore take into consideration the goals of academic freedom and
the rights and interests of all parties concerned, including the benefit
to the general public.
The public has a right to receive the fruits of knowledge that is
a derivative of the research and teaching of any scholar, regardless of
personal, economic, or political aspirations of the people involved.
Similarly, when external factors interfere with scholars’ academic
freedom, the prestige and the well-functioning of an academic
institution is also breached. Students’ academic freedom and interests
may also be compromised if their access to the results of certain studies
or certain teachers is denied or restricted.
2.

The Diversity of Potential Entities Interfering
with Scholars’ Academic Freedom

A breach of scholars’ academic freedom can have multiple
sources. The state might intervene with a scholar’s academic freedom
by restricting the subject of his or her research. Academic institutions
might breach a scholar’s right to equality by denying an academic’s
position because she is a woman. Students might breach scholars’
academic freedom by class disturbances. 73 Political entities might
intervene with scholars’ academic freedom by indirectly (through
students, the institution, or fellow scholars) imposing racist admission
rules. Religious entities might interfere with academic freedom by
forcing certain research conclusions.
Suissa and Sullivan point out, for instance, that “[a]ttempts to
remove academics from their posts can take the form of coordinated
campaigns of (often anonymous) complaints to university
administrators, which [] . . . may fail in the goal of getting the target
fired.”74 They add that another tactic is to launch a petition calling for
72

See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
Judith Suissa & Alice Sullivan, The Gender Wars, Academic Freedom and
Education, 55 J. PHIL. EDUC. 1, 62 (2021) (referring, for instance, to a case whereby
several academics have faced attempts to get them sacked by student activists
angered by their gender concepts).
74
Id. at 61.
73

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol38/iss1/7

16

Aharoni-Goldenberg and Leisman: Balancing Clashing Scholars

2022

BALANCING CLASHING SCHOLARS

137

an academic with dissenting views to be fired. Hence, general
campaigns may be launched by anonymous or vague entities in order
to breach academic rights. Finally, scholars might also intervene with
peers’ academic freedom by refusing to review a colleague’s draft
paper, for instance, because of the scholar’s religion.75 Suissa and
Sullivan claim that, after expressing concern about the alleged
harassment of fellow academics, their colleagues refused to work with
them.76 The idea of a variety of intervening factors with scholars’
academic freedom is represented by figure 1 below.

Figure 1.

Hence, scholars’ academic freedom serves as a shield protecting them
from a wide variety of intervening factors, such as the state, students,
academic institutions, religious, political, and economic entities,
academic associations, and fellow scholars.

75
76

See id. at 61.
Id. at 62.
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Clashing Scholars’ Rights—Suggested
Balancing Tests

Basic human rights are not absolute. They can be balanced
against other competing rights, values, and interests. However, the
literature is relatively scarce with regard to clashes between clashing
scholars’ academic freedoms.
Clashes between scholars’ rights vary in nature and intensity.
Depending on the facts and context, different breaches of academic
freedom by fellow peers will entail different courses of action. Some
may entail philosophical, moral, and ethical consequences but de facto
amount to damnum absque injuria,77 namely, a breach of a right that
does not give rise to a cause of action. While other breaches of
academic rights will call for judicial intervention, some will be
confined to a personal-ethical level and entail a “corridor
conversation,” and others to an informal dean-scholar talk, or to
disciplinary proceedings. The most severe ones will give rise to a
judicial injunction. Yet, all cases require a balancing mechanism to
assist in deciding how to cope with the clash, be it on an ethical,
disciplinary, or legal basis.
We suggest that, when a conflict between opposing academic
freedoms arises, the following reasoning should be implemented.
First, regard should be given to whether the activities in question are
indeed covered by academic freedom. Second, regard should be paid
to whether academic freedom is compromised. Third, if there are
conflicting academic freedoms, those rights should be weighed
against each other, incorporating the following suggested three
normative prioritizing tests (balancing tests). We therefore suggest
applying three balancing tests in order to deal with conflicting
academic rights. The relevance test, the “seclusive” v. “exclusive”
exercise of rights test, and the virtue test.
i.

The Relevance Test

We hold that in evaluating two clashing academic rights,
regards should also be given to the nature of the activities in hand and
to their proximity to academia and research. The closer in nature the
77

Patrick D. Halligan, Freedom of Expression and Employment Security in the
Public Service: Different Rights with Different Remedies, 21 CAL. W. L. REV. 47, 84
n.182 (1984) (translating damnum absque injuria as a loss without injury).
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activity is to the substance of promoting research, education, and
culture, the greater its weight. Conversely, the more remote the
activity is from the essence of academia, the lower its weight. The
relevance test is therefore applied using professional tools. Are we
dealing with a methodological activity or is it driven by personal,
political, or economic interests? Does the activity at hand verify facts
in a critical way? Does it reach conclusions by the best existing
methods? Is it aimed at passing the truth to students? 78 Hence, for
instance, lesser impact should be given to disturbing political activities
over professional symposia.
We maintain that, in applying the relevance test, the interests
of the four beneficiaries of academic freedom should also be
considered: scholars, students, academic institutions, and the general
public.
ii.

“Seclusion” v. “Exclusion” Test

The following analysis examines the mode of realization of the
clashing rights, rather than their content. We hold that in reviewing
the way in which a right is exercised, one may distinguish between two
notions: a “seclusive” exercise of a right and an “exclusionary”
exercise of a right.
In our view, the notion of a seclusive exercise of a right comes
from the term “seclusion,” namely private. It refers to an exercise of
a right that does not harm others and does not breach their respective
rights. Conversely, an exclusionary exercise of a right refers to an
action which excludes the rights of others—trespasses and breaches
them.
Logically, seclusive rights should take priority over
exclusionary ones, as the liberty of the one cannot come at the expense
of the other. Generally, fairness requires that the unharmful exercise
of a right, that does not trespass and breach the rights of others, will
take priority over a trespassing one. To put it in Abraham Lincoln’s
words:
The world has never had a good definition of the word
liberty . . . . With some, the word liberty may mean for
each man to do as he pleases with himself, and the
product of his labor; while with others the same word
78

See JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION
PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 122 (1944).
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may mean for some men to do as they please with other
men . . . . Here are two . . . incompatible things, called
by the same name—liberty. And it follows that each of
the things is, by the respective parties, called by two
different and incompatible names—liberty and
tyranny.79
For instance, can driver A claim to have freedom of movement
and thus crash into a driver B’s car? In such a case there a clash
between equal rights that differ in their exercise. Driver A exercises
his freedom of movement in an exclusionary way, by breaching
driver’s B’s right to property, which is exercised in a seclusive way.
Therefore, the seclusive exercise of the right to property should take
priority, as it does not breach the right of another. Generally, it is best
for an exclusionary exercise of a right to be accompanied by a judicial
writ for it to take priority over a seclusive one. The judicial
intervention should be rare and justified. It should be granted upon
evidence showing that the alleged seclusive rights are in fact
exclusionary.
The same reasoning applies in academia. Academic freedom
confers special rights upon scholars but also comes with obligations
and is not unlimited. The exercise of academic freedom is subject to
the respect of the rights of fellow scholars and to the duty to ensure
respect for contrary views. Hence, we maintain that when there is a
clash between scholars’ academic freedoms, regard should be paid to
the mode of realization of the two rights. An exclusionary exercise of
academic freedom interfering with peers’ rights, is of lesser weight in
comparison to a seclusive exercise of academic freedom. Take for
instance, a case where scholar A is invited to give a speech at a
conference and scholar B continually interrupts her by shouting at her.
In such a case there is a clash between academic freedom of expression
of the two scholars. Yet, scholar A’s exercise of academic freedom is
seclusive and therefore takes priority over scholar B’s right to
academic expression as represented in Figure 2.

79

ERIC FONER, GIVE ME LIBERTY!: AN AMERICAN HISTORY BRIEF (2004).
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Figure 2. Representation of Academic B’s overlapping the exercise of
Academic A’s academic expression.

iii.

The Virtue Test

Human rights are of immense importance and yet, they are not
equal in weight. We hold that in prioritizing clashing human rights,
regard should be given to the nature of the right at hand, to its virtue
and to the agenda behind the exercise of the right in question. This
balancing process entails a normative vertical analysis that is based on
humanistic, liberal, and democratic values. For instance, when a
restaurant’s owner bars a black client’s admission to his restaurant,
there is a clash between the owner’s right to property and autonomy,
and the client’s right to equality. Applying the suggested normative
mechanism, generally, greater weight should be attached to the right
of equality than to the right to property, as it promotes democratic and
humanistic values.
A similar conclusion can be inspired by the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms that protects
several fundamental rights.80
Article 17 thereof restricts the
exploitation of these rights, not only by the state, but also by
individuals and groups.81 In applying Article 17, the European Court
of Human Rights (“E.C.H.R.”) inquires, inter alia, as to whether the
applicant belongs to a group with totalitarian aspirations. The
E.C.H.R. especially employs Article 17 in relation to anti-Semitism.

80

European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 11.
Id. at art. 17 (“Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed
at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their
limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.”).
81
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For instance, it has completely removed holocaust denial from the
protection of freedom of expression by the application of Article 17.
In Lehideux v. France82 it was ruled that the denial of well-established
historical facts, such as the Holocaust, undermines the values against
which racism and anti-Semitism are based and constitutes a serious
threat to social order; such actions are incompatible with democracy
and human rights because they violate the rights of others; the
supporters of these activities have aspirations that fall within the
category of prohibited purposes under Article 17 of the Convention. 83
Clearly, this line of reasoning is restricted to the European Union. Yet,
when dealing with universities’ institutional autonomy, this balance of
two clashing rights is not restrictively formal and it could serve as a
normative source of inspiration.
Moving from the general to the specific, in dealing with
conflicting academic rights and applying the suggested normative test,
regard should be paid to the virtue and substance of the rights involved.
Greater weight should be attached to exercise of academic freedom
that enhances humanistic, liberal, and democratic values, as opposed
to racist or totalitarian manifestations.
Conversely, Michiel Bot claims that the right to call for a
boycott follows from the fundamental right to freedom of speech,
which is, “a political right to aim to affect . . . public opinion . . . which
outweighs private rights when the expression is not aimed at private
but at public purposes.”84 The severity of this notion can be detected
from Bot’s reasoning, which attempts to bleach the Nazi boycott of
Jews at the beginning of World War II:
[A]lthough there had been Nazi boycotts of Jewish
stores before, the most notorious Nazi boycott of
Jewish businesses on 1 April 1933 was a reaction
against a transnational anti-Nazi boycott of German
merchandise to protest Nazi anti-Semitism . . .
Although the anti-Nazi boycott movement was
strongest in the United States, it also included Jewish
organizations in England[] [and] France. . . . Some

82

Lehideux v. France, Case No. 55/1997/839/1045, App. No. 24662/94 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. 1998).
83
Id. at 20.
84
Michiel Bot, The Right to Boycott: BDS, Law, and Politics in a Global Context,
10 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 421, 432 (2019).
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historians have argued that this transnational boycott
movement remained very limited, but the Nazis
repeatedly claimed that it was hurting their economic
interests. Hitler himself . . . criticized the boycott . . . .85
In other words, in Bot's view, the Nazis boycotted Jews on a
discriminatory basis and in return, organizations boycotted the Nazi
regime, which was troubled by this and increased the anti-Jewish
boycott. In a disturbing fashion, Bot seems to justify the Nazi boycott
of Jewish stores (and teachers and academics—we add), because it was
a retaliation to a transnational general boycott of the Nazi
discriminatory regime and the result of a counter-boycott of Jewish
organizations of the Nazi regime. Bot declined to mention how the
discriminatory boycott against Jews ended.
According to his line of thought, if the goal of a political
expression concerns the general public, it outweighs private rights of
individuals who may get harmed in the process. This is an alarming
notion according to which the (public) end of political activities
justifies the means, namely breach of human rights. Arguing that the
end justifies the means puts its claimant in three roles—legislator,
judge, and executioner. This line of reasoning might lead to alarming
results. We hold that in a democratic society, political aspirations, be
they personal or public, cannot come at the expense of others. The aim
does not justify the means if the means involve a breach of human
rights.
The same reasoning applies in academia. In Keyishian, Justice
Brennan (majority) noted that a legitimate purpose cannot be pursued
by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the
end can be more narrowly achieved. 86
4.

The Scope of Scholars’ Academic Freedom—
Conclusions

In this Part we have discussed the scope of scholars’ academic
freedom and its limits. We advanced three tests for dealing with
conflicting academic rights. Scholars’ academic freedom is composed
of two pillars. The first pillar concerns inclusion. The second pillar
concerns academic expression in teaching and research, freedom of
85
86

Id. at 427.
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2022

23

Touro Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 1 [2022], Art. 7

144

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 38

opinion, political participation outside academia and freedom to
receive academic materials. Academic freedom is limited by
professional standards and is applicable intramurally. It is subject to
the respect of the rights of fellow scholars’ rights to equality.
When a dispute arises between scholars the following scheme
should be adopted in evaluating it. Firstly, regard should be given to
whether the activities in question are indeed covered by academic
freedom. Secondly, regard should be paid to whether academic
freedom is compromised. Thirdly, if there are two conflicting
academic freedoms, we suggest adopting the following three
prioritization tests. First, the virtue test, incorporates a substantive
analysis of the clashing rights to academic freedom. According to this
test, the closer in nature the activity is to academia, the greater its
weight. Second, “seclusion” v. “exclusion” test. An exclusionary
exercise of academic freedom interfering with peers’ rights is of lesser
weight than a seclusive exercise of academic freedom. Third,
according to the virtue test, greater weight should be attached to
activities promoting humanistic, liberal, and democratic values.
III.

PART TWO- CLASHING SCHOLARS’ ACADEMIC FREEDOMS
AND THE CAMPAIGN

The Campaign entails the possible conflict between scholars’
academic freedoms. On the one hand, Israeli scholars’ academic
freedom and on the other hand, the academic freedom of faculty
participating in the Campaign (hereinafter: Campaigning Scholars or
Campaigners), protesting against the political reality in the Middle
East. This is a general classification, but one that is required for the
sake of an abstract analysis.
This Part applies the normative conclusions concerning the
scope of academic freedom and the suggested balancing tests of
clashing scholars’ academic freedoms to issues arising from the
Campaign. Section D reviews the Campaign, its roots, and its
ideological platform. Section E analyzes Israeli scholars’ academic
freedom and its possible infringement by the Campaign. Section F
reviews Campaigning Scholars’ academic freedom and its scope.
Finally, Section G applies the suggested balancing tests to the
Campaign.
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The Campaign—General

This Section reviews and analyzes the sources of the
Campaign, its background and its initiatives against Israeli scholars
and institutions.
1.

The Campaign—Background and Ideology

Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (“B.D.S.” or the
“Movement”) is a political movement created in 2002.87 The B.D.S.
site urges “nonviolent pressure on Israel” until it meets three demands.
First: “Ending its occupation and colonization of all Arab lands and
dismantling the Wall.”88 Second: “Recognizing the fundamental
rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality.” 89
Third: Promoting the rights of more than seven million Palestinian
refugees and their descendants to return to Israel. 90 The B.D.S. website
issues a triple call. First, “boycott”—withdrawing support from
Israel’s regime. Second, “divestment”—withdrawing investments
from the State of Israel and Israeli companies. Third, “sanctions”—
pressuring governments to fulfil their legal obligations to end “Israeli
apartheid.”91 The B.D.S. leader and co-founder is Omar Barghouti.
He referred to the “Jews” who live in Israel as wrongdoers and
indicated his aspiration that, in the future state that will substitute for
Israel, they will be “settlers.” 92 There are considerable indications that
ties exist between some B.D.S. leaders and terror. 93
An assembly of Palestinian academics and intellectuals
launched the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural

Alex Joffe, Palestinians and Internationalization: Means and Ends, BEGIN–
SADAT
CTR.
STRATEGIC
STUDS.
(Nov.
26,
2017),
https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/palestinians-internationalization-meansends.
88
What is BDS?, BDS NAT’L COMM., https://bdsmovement.net/what-is-bds (last
visited Jan. 19, 2020).
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Terrorists in Suits – The Ties between NGOs Promoting BDS and Terrorist
Organizations, STATE ISRAEL MINISTRY OF STRATEGIC AFFS. & PUB. DIPL., Feb.
2019, at 5, 5-6.
87
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Boycott of Israel (“P.A.C.B.I.”) in 2004. 94 P.A.C.B.I.’s co-founder,
Omar Barghouti, is also the co-founder of the B.D.S.95 P.A.C.B.I. is
not a registered entity, but rather a campaign comprised primarily of
scholars from across the Palestinian Authority. 96 P.A.C.B.I. acts as the
cultural and academic arm of the B.D.S. National Committee
(“B.N.C.”).97
P.A.C.B.I. generally claims that, “[a]ll Israeli academic
institutions, unless proven otherwise, are complicit in maintaining the
Israeli occupation and denial of basic Palestinian rights.”98 It further
argues that, “these institutions are deeply complicit in the Israeli
system of oppression that has denied Palestinians their basic rights
guaranteed by international law, or has hampered their exercise of
these rights, including academic freedom and the right to education.” 99
P.A.C.B.I. urges academics, academic associations/unions, and
academic institutions to “boycott and/or work towards the cancellation
or annulment of events, activities, agreements, or projects involving
Israeli academic institutions or that otherwise promote the
normalization of Israel in the global academy, whitewash Israel’s
violations of international law and Palestinian rights, or violate the
B.D.S. guidelines.”100
The Movement calls, not only for boycott, a passive form of
behavior, but also for action, to “work towards the cancellation or
annulment of events.”101 The call is not limited towards academic
institutions, but more generally refers to “agreements, or projects . . .
that otherwise promote the normalization of Israel in the global
academy.”102 The call also targets Israeli academics. P.A.C.B.I.’s

94

Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel, supra note

2.
95

Omar
Barghouti,
CANARY
MISSION,
https://canarymission.org/individual/Omar_Barghouti (last visited Jan. 20, 2020).
96
Dan Diker & Adam Shay, The PACBI Deception: Unmasked–Terror Links and
Political Warfare Masquerading as Human Rights, JERUSALEM CTR. PUB. AFFS.,
2019, at 5, 7.
97
Id. at 5.
98
PACBI Issues Guidelines for Applying Academic Boycott of Israel, BOYCOTT,
DIVESTMENT, SANCTIONS (Oct. 6, 2009), https://bdsmovement.net/pacbi/academicboycott-guidelines.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
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guideline six refers to, “[s]pecial academic honors or recognition
granted to Israeli officials, representatives of Israeli academic
institutions.”103 Guideline ten, disallows reviewing dissertations and
writing letters of recommendations for Israeli faculty.104
2.

Initiatives against Israeli Scholars and
Institutions

This Section analyses the nature of the Campaign. It describes
the targeted entities and perpetrators, and refers to its manifestations.
i.

The Targeted Entities

In some instances, the Campaign targets academic institutions.
In 2005, the Council of the Association of University Teachers
(“A.U.T.”) voted to boycott Bar-Ilan University because of its
connection with Ariel University, located on the West Bank, and Haifa
University—allegedly because it had wrongly disciplined a lecturer for
supporting a student who wrote about attacks on Palestinians during
the founding of the State of Israel. 105 The A.U.T. reversed the
decision.106
In other instances, individual scholars are the direct targets of
the Campaign. For example, the research of Hadassah Medical Center
in Jerusalem requested that a researcher of Oslo University send
genetic material to aid Palestinian victims of a blood disorder.107 The
latter refused, “due to the present situation in the Middle East.” 108
Similarly, the organizers of the European Association of Israel Studies
(“E.A.I.S.”) at the University of London, informed Ariel University’s

103

Id.
Id.
105
Palestinian Academic Call for International Academic Boycott of Israel, RIGHT
TO
EDUC.:
ACTIVISM
NEWS
(July
7,
2004),
https://web.archive.org/web/20050518033015/http://right2edu.birzeit.edu/news/arti
cle178;
To
boldly
go,
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
20,
2005),
https://www.theguardian.com/education/2005/apr/20/highereducation.uk3.
106
Academics Vote Against Israeli Boycott, GUARDIAN (May 26, 2021),
https://www.theguardian.com/education/2005/may/26/highereducation.uk1.
107
Manfred Gerstenfeld, The Academic Boycott Against Israel, 15 JERUSALEM CTR.
PUB. AFFS. 9, 50 (2003).
108
Id.
104
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scholars that they could not represent their university because it is in
the West Bank; the two withdrew from the conference.109
ii.

The Campaigners

Generally, the perpetrators of the Campaign are individual
scholars. Only rarely do official academic institutions formally join in
the initiative. In 2019, the University of Cape Town (“U.C.T.”) Senate
adopted a resolution that “UCT [will] not enter into any formal
relationships with Israeli academic institutions enabling gross human
rights violations in the occupied Palestinian Territories.”110 The
resolution was finally rejected. 111 Some academic associations have
discussed calls to boycott Israeli scholars and institutions. Most of the
proposed resolutions of these associations have been rescinded or
rejected.112
iii.

The Manifestations of the Campaign

The steps taken against Israeli scholars vary in nature; 113 some
set forth entry barriers to academia. For instance, in 2013, a professor
at Sydney University denied fellowship to a professor at the Hebrew
109

British Conference Tries to Force Israeli Scholars to Hide University Affiliations,
ALGEMEINER
(Oct.
3,
2014,
10:10
AM),
https://www.algemeiner.com/2014/10/03/british-conference-tries-to-force-israelischolars-to-hide-university-affiliation.
110
South Africa University Refused Support for Israel Boycott, MIDDLE E. MONITOR
(Nov. 28, 2019, 10:57 AM), https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20191128-southafrica-university-refuses-support-for-israel-boycott.
See also Ilanit Chernick,
Africa’s Top University Nixes Motion to Boycott Israel, JERUSALEM POST (Nov. 25,
2019, 8:45 PM), https://www.jpost.com/Diaspora/Africas-top-university-rescindsmotion-to-academically-boycott-Israel-608871.
111
See sources cited supra note 110.
112
Maya Shwayder, US Scholars’ Group Votes in Favor of Academic Boycott of
Israel, JERUSALEM POST (Dec. 16, 2013), https://www.jpost.com/International/USscholars-group-votes-in-favor-of-academic-boycott-of-Israel-335178 (noting that in
2013, the Association for Asian American voted to boycott Israeli academic
institutions); see also Valerie Strauss, U.S. Academic Group Votes to Boycott Israeli
Universities,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
16,
2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2013/12/16/u-s-academicgroup-votes-to-boycott-israeliuniversities/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.bd3ff2307b6b (noting that the American
Studies Association (“A.S.A.”) voted to join the campaign).
113
Out of respect for the scholars concerned, we omit to specify their names.
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University, so as not to support institutions with ties to the Israeli
military and the West Bank occupation. 114 Not sharing academic
materials also bars entry to academia. For example, a French scholar
refused to provide an Israeli researcher with an antiserum, explaining,
“as long as I see no serious effort made by your home country to
achieve peace . . . I will not send you the antisera.” 115
Other activities amount to actual exclusion from academia. For
example, a then Professor of Manchester University and Editor-InChief of two journals, fired two Israeli professors from the editorial
board, stating: “My decision is political, not personal . . . but I do not
wish to continue an official association with any Israeli.” 116 One of
the two responded, “I would appreciate it if the announcement made it
clear that . . . ‘he [that is, I] was appointed as a scholar and unappointed
as an Israeli.’”117 Class disturbances and interruptions of lectures also
amount to exclusionary steps. For example, two dozen protesters
shouted down a Professor at New York University and the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem, at the University of Minnesota. 118
In conclusion, the Campaign’s source is B.D.S. and P.A.C.B.I.
movements calling to work against Israeli academia and headed by
political, rather than academic, figures some of whom have
questionable ties to terror. 119 The Campaign is mostly implemented

Dan Goldberg, BDS Case Splits Australia’s Pro-Israel Lobby, HAARETZ (June 6,
2014),
https://www.haaretz.com/jewish/.premium-bds-case-splits-oz-pro-israellobby-1.5250823.
115
The authors thank Professor Zvi Zigler of the Technion for providing the
correspondence.
116
Email from Mona Baker, Professor of Translation Stud., Univ. Manchester Inst.
Sci. & Tech., to Gideon Toury, Professor, Tel Aviv Univ. (Aug. 6, 2002, 8:02 PM).
117
Id. (alteration in original).
118
Dale Carpenter, Israeli Academic Shouted Down in Lecture at University of
Minnesota,
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
4,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/11/04/israeliacademic-shouted-down-in-lecture-at-university-ofminnesota/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c140ccab8e00.
119
See Haidar Eid et al., Looking for a Leadership with a Strategy, AL SHABAKA
(Mar. 19, 2012), https://al-shabaka.org/roundtables/looking-for-a-leadership-with-astrategy; ISRAELI MINISTRY OF STRATEGIC AFFAIRS, TERRORISTS IN SUITS: THE TIES
BETWEEN NGOS PROMOTING BDS AND TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 5-6 (2019).
The report is based on a variety of sources: online sites, social media, the Israel
Security Agency, judicial decisions and others. Id. at 5. See also Toi Staff, Israel
Shutters 30 BDS Fundraising Accounts by Revealing Alleged Terror Ties, TIMES OF
114
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from within academia by Campaigning Scholars. It is manifested,
inter alia, by nationality-based hiring and firing of scholars and is not
only directed against Israeli academic institutions, but rather at
particular Israeli scholars. De facto, the Campaign’s manifestations
exceed P.A.C.B.I.’s guidelines.
B.

The Campaign and Israeli Scholars’ Academic
Freedom

This Section examines the nature and the extent of the
Campaign’s interference with Israeli scholars’ academic freedom and
applies the two pillars of academic freedom to various aspects of the
Campaign. It focuses on the steps taken by Campaigning Scholars,
and not on the activity of political organizations external to academia.
The starting point of this review is that Israeli scholars, like any other
teacher, have a right to enjoy to the fullest extent their academic
freedom in all its aspects—inclusion and expression.
1.

Interference with Scholars’ Right to
Academic Inclusion

The first pillar of scholars’ academic freedom is inclusion. We
maintain that like any other scholar, Israeli scholars, have the right to
participate in research, teaching, writing and become a member of
professional academic bodies. This key notion has several aspects:
meritocracy, equality, and the provision of a pro-educational academic
environment.
This Section explores whether the Campaign
compromises this freedom and, if so, to what extent.
i.

The Campaign and Capacity

Scholars’ access to academia may mainly be subject to capacity
and evaluated on academic and professional grounds primarily by
peers. If the reasons for exclusions from academia are not
professional—but rather political, they breach academic freedom.
However, the Campaign advances disregard to scholars’
capacity, aspirations, motivation, rigor, publications, research, and

ISRAEL (June 11, 2019, 5:42 AM), https://www.timesofisrael.com/campaignshutters-30-bds-fundraising-accounts-by-revealing-ties-to-terrorism.
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teaching skills and thus breaches academic freedom. There is no claim
by the Campaign’s supporters that the writing or teaching of Israeli
scholars are inadequate. The claim that can be inferred from the
Campaign is that they are not worthy of taking part in academia for
other, unprofessional, and political reasons. Moreover, the Campaign
de facto brings about the evaluation of teaching and research of Israeli
scholars—not by peers, but rather by political activists.
Hence, the Campaign substitutes a professional entry-barrier to
academia with politically motivated admission requirements.
Substituting meritocracy with irrelevant political ideology, not only
disrupts Israeli scholars’ academic freedom, but also undermines the
very essence of academia. It disregards the interest of students,
academic institutions, and the general public to enjoy the fruits of
academic expertise, experience, effort, and perseverance.
ii.

The Campaign and Equality

Respect for human dignity calls for equal treatment in
academia. There is no room for discrimination in granting access to
higher education positions and in academic life. Mistreating a scholar
because he or she is black, Muslim, Jewish or Israeli is discriminatory
and unacceptable in the workplace—and certainly in academia.
Israeli scholars, like every other human being, have the right to
equal treatment whatever their religion, nationality or academic
affiliation. However, it seems to us that the Campaign tries to
condition academic participation upon belonging to the “right”
nationality, culture, race, religion, residence, or political affiliation,
rather than merits. No real “culpability” of Israeli universities is
claimed and proved by P.A.C.B.I. The Campaign targets Israeli
scholars for being Israeli and advances mistreating a scholar because
he or she is Jewish, or Israeli.
The Campaign has therefore been criticized for its
discriminatory nature. For instance, former Harvard president,
Professor Lawrence Summers, noted that Israel was being unfairly
“singled out” when other countries human rights records were far
worse.120 He called Israel-boycott efforts “anti-Semitic in their effect

120

Paras D. Bhayani, Summers Says British Boycott of Israeli Academic is
Intentionally
‘Anti-Semitic’,
HARV.
CRIMSON
(June
2,
2006),
https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2006/6/2/summers-says-british-boycott-of-
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if not their intent.”121 In Avneri, Judge Amit ruled that: “The
academic-cultural boycott is . . . a crude device that targets the entire
academic community and the institution itself, without distinction, and
as such, in flagrant contradiction to academic freedom, and it is worthy
only of contempt.”122
C.

The Campaign and Pro-educational Academic
Environment

Academic inclusion requires the provision of a safe and
welcoming academic environment. A campus environment should be
welcoming towards faculty members of all religions and nationalities,
otherwise, it would de facto serve as an impediment to academic
inclusion. However, the Campaign brings about an unsafe campus
environment ostracizing Israeli scholars.
The Campaign, accompanied by violent demonstrations and
the exclusion of academics from open and civilized discourse, does not
allow room for speculation and experiment. Moreover, campus B.D.S.
activities, such as “Apartheid Weeks” or turbulent anti-Israeli rallies,
might intimidate Israeli scholars and even worse—Jewish students.123
Hostility is not only manifested by violent anti-Israeli
activities. A “cold” environment can serve as an unfair barrier as well.
For instance, a faculty in which scholars abstain from talking to an
Israeli peer due to his or her nationality equally interferes with
academic freedom. Furthermore, the mere knowledge that a colleague
actively supports the Campaign, having ties to terrorism, may impair
academic collaborations. We thus contend that Israeli scholars’
academic freedom is restricted by the Campaign on campuses that

israeli. Professor Anthony Julius and Professor Alan Dershowitz have each argued
that the boycotts are intrinsically anti-Semitic employing anti-Zionism as a cover for
“Jew-hatred.” Anthony Julius & Alan Dershowitz, The Contemporary Fight Against
Anti-Semitism,
TIMES
ONLINE
(June
13,
2007),
https://web.archive.org/web/20090826051726/http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/co
mment/columnists/guest_contributors/article1928865.ece.
121
Bhayani, supra note 120.
122
Opinions of the Supreme Court of Israel: A Project of Cardozo Law, VERSA,
https://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/topics/torts (last visited Jan. 4, 2022); see also HCJ
5239/11 Avneri v. Knesset OD (2015) (Isr.) (in Hebrew).
123
Matt Lebovic, ‘Apartheid Week’ Really Does Threaten Israel, Some Experts
Warn, TIMES OF ISRAEL (Mar. 18, 2016), https://www.timesofisrael.com/apartheidweek-really-does-threaten-israel-some-experts-warn.
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allow for the existence of a systematic hostile environment, whereby
academics may be socially shunned, boycotted, or intimidated.
1.

Interference with Scholars’ Academic
Freedom of Expression

The second pillar of Israeli scholars’ academic freedom
concerns academic freedom of expression, which consists of several
aspects: freedom of expression in teaching and research, freedom of
opinion, and the right to seek and receive academic information. 124
This Section explores whether the Campaign compromises academic
freedom of expression and to what extent.
i.

The Campaign and Freedom of
Expression in Teaching and in
Research

Academic freedom of expression means participating in
academic dialogue. A university community, including its faculty,
staff, administrators, and students, ought to cultivate a norm of respect
for free speech that goes beyond ensuring mere First Amendment
compliance. The academic community is vulnerable to political
pressures, as it could undermine academic freedom and distort the free
exchange of ideas. 125 Academic freedom of expression refers to
freedom of expression in teaching and in research that is meant to
cultivate dialogue. Members of a university community ought to
consider opposing viewpoints and/or at least allow others to do so.
The Campaign is the antithesis of dialogue. It represents a
dogmatic view of one group’s truth and regards a dispute having its
roots in biblical times as having only one position for solution. Wattad
argued that
[a]cademic boycott stands in contradiction to the notion
of dialogue. Academic boycott is nothing but the
adherence to the boycotters’ monologue. Monologues
associated with boycotts suggest the existence of a

124

See infra Part II.C.1.(c).
UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 8, at 48 (“Expressing concern regarding
the vulnerability of the academic community to untoward political pressures which
could undermine academic freedom . . . .”).
125
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single indisputable truth. This is a story of a monopoly
claim on truth, which eliminates possible competition .
. . over the truth. Obviously, dialogues, unlike
monologues, create a real chance for the truth to surface
and emerge. At the end of the day, an academic boycott
resembles an authoritarian regime’s dictate of a single
“truth.” 126
Wattad further observed that academic boycotters aspire to
disseminate their own opinion while silencing opposing opinions. 127
The Campaign’s all-or-nothing view poses a threat to academic
freedom and undermines the very idea of a university. Garasic and
Keinan contend that boycotting Israeli academics is a form of
censorship, as it prevents dialogue and is antithetical to the mission of
the academy.128 Similarly, in Avneri, Justice Amit noted that
[a]n academic-cultural boycott muzzles expression in
the plain meaning of the term. Granting a monopoly to
one stand in the marketplace of ideas is the absolute
antithesis of freedom of expression and the idea of a
free marketplace of opinions. The cultural-academic
boycott of Israel is intended to paralyze and silence
political expression, impose one opinion and one
“truth” . . . . Voltaire was ready to fight for an
opponent’s freedom of expression, but surely would not
have been willing to shed his own last drop of blood to
defend that opponent’s right to silence him. 129
In Sweezy, it was stressed that “[n]o field of education is so thoroughly
comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made.
Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any,
principles are accepted as absolutes.” 130 Yet, most of the Campaign’s
manifestations are to be found in these fields.

Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad, When Freedom of Expression Says “No”: The
Case against Academic Boycott, 171 TELOS 76, 86 (2015).
127
Id.
128
See generally Mirko D. Garasic & Shay Keinan, Boycotting Israeli Academia: Is
its Implementation Anti-Semitic?, 15 INT’L. J. DISCRIM. L. 189 (2015).
129
Opinions of the Supreme Court of Israel: A Project of Cardozo Law, supra note
122; see also HCJ 5239/11 Avneri v. Knesset OD (2015) (Isr.) (in Hebrew).
130
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
126
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Academic censorship in this regard can take several forms.
The obvious manifestation of this stance is in disruptive
demonstrations held at lectures given by Israeli scholars, which
constitutes a de facto breach of academic expression.131 There are
more subtle ways to interfere with academic expression. This can
occur before a speech by having the speaker “disinvited” to the
podium, by not inviting a relevant scholar to a conference, or not
accepting a paper worthy of review for publication.
ii.

The Campaign and Academic
Freedom of Opinion

As discussed above, academic freedom means freedom to
participate in the academic arena regardless of opinions. 132
Questioning and exploring new ideas, and diversity of thought are
essential elements of academic inquiry.
However, the Campaign interferes with academic freedom of
opinion. First, living or working in Israel might stand to mean a
support of the State of Israel. Campaigning Scholars’ de facto
“punish” Israeli scholars for their association with the State of Israel
and assumed political opinions, thus acting as thought police.
Provided Israeli scholars adhere to professional standards, their
political opinions should not be used as an entrance barrier to
academia. This stance is true, not only regarding academic opinions,
but also to general opinions.
Second, freedom of opinion means autonomous decision
making that is free from coercion. 133 However, the Campaign employs
coercive means and adopts actual pressure on scholars to ostracize
Israeli researchers from academic forums. A renowned scholar, for
example, agreed to participate in a conference in Israel but was
pressured to rescind attendance by non-governmental entities, and

131

See Carpenter, supra note 118 (discussing a lecturer who was shouted down by
two dozen protesters as he tried to begin a lecture before about 100 students and
faculty at the University of Minnesota).
132
Infra Part II.B.1.
133
See World Declaration on Higher Education, supra note 13 (referring to the right
to enjoy academic autonomy and freedom).
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possible fellow scholars. 134 Recently, another allegedly coercive
aspect of the Campaign seems to have arisen. A professor of history
at the University of New South Wales, Australia, was being jointly
awarded the Dan David prize for her work on the history of health and
medicine along with two others.135 She was “urged to turn down this
highly lucrative Israeli award in an open letter signed by circa 250
academics,” which stated that “it serves to legitimise and normalise
Israel’s colonial violence and apartheid.” 136
Mann criticized the Campaign for being coercive: “The B.D.S.
movement professes nonviolence . . . . [and] aims to trigger political
change not by winning the hearts and minds of Jewish Israelis, but
through financial and symbolic pressure.” 137 We maintain that
depending on its nature and intensity, such pressures may amount to
an undue interference with a scholar’s academic freedom. While
writing a protest letter seems to be a legitimate way of expressing
oneself, systematic badgering may amount to coercion and
interference with academic freedom of opinion.
iii.

The Campaign and the Right to Seek
and Receive Academic Information

The third aspect of academic freedom of expression concerns
the right to seek and receive academic materials and fruits of
knowledge. All scholars, no matter their religion and nationality, have
the right to acquire documentary material and access databases in all
formats “regardless of national frontiers.” 138 Denying an academic
colleague access to the fruits of research is a denial of freedom of
expression.

Judy Maltz, A Brief History of Stephen Hawking’s Complicated Relationship With
Israel, HAARETZ (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/stephenhawking-s-complicated-relationship-with-israel-1.5906160.
135
MEE Staff, Australian Historian Urged to Return Israeli Health Prize by 250
Academics,
MIDDLE
E.
EYE
(Feb.
25,
2021),
https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/israel-palestine-alison-bashford-dan-davidprize-call-reject.
136
Id.
137
Itamar Mann, On the Law, Politics, and Ethics of BDS, 114 S. ATL. Q. 671, 675
(2015).
138
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 10, at art. 19.
134

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol38/iss1/7

36

Aharoni-Goldenberg and Leisman: Balancing Clashing Scholars

2022

BALANCING CLASHING SCHOLARS
2.

157

The Campaign and the Interference with
Scholars’ Academic Freedom—Conclusions

While some Campaigners’ activities seem to be a legitimate
expression of opinion, other activities seem to interfere with two pillars
of Israeli Scholars’ academic freedom, consisting of inclusion within
academia and of academic freedom of expression, thus, breaching the
very fundamentals of academic freedom. First, inclusion. The
Campaign substitutes political ideology and national origin for
professional capacity as an admission barrier to academia. 139 The
Campaign infringes on the right to equality as it discriminates between
scholars of different nationalities, instead of supporting international
cooperation. The Campaign further disrupts the aspiration to achieve
a pro-educational academic environment, as it creates an atmosphere
of hostility, fear, and mistrust. Most notorious is the “coloring” or
discrimination of scholars based on their nationality, rather than on
their writing and teaching. 140
Second, the Campaign seems to interfere with academic
freedom of expression as it aspires to prevent dialogue by censorship,
and to enforce a singular view. It also breaches academic freedom of
opinion, manifested by shunning scholars who have expressed their
political views through their connection to certain universities or living
in a given country. Further, freedom of opinion means autonomous
decision making that is free from coercion. However, at times, the
Campaign employs coercive means to influence its ideology.
D.

Campaigners’ Right to Academic Freedom

This Section explores the scope of Campaigners’ academic
freedom by referring to their freedom of expression, political rights
and to whether their end may justify their means.
1.

Involvement in the Campaign and Academic
Freedom

Academic freedom protects freedom of opinion and academic
expression, whatever that opinion may be. 141 It could be claimed that
139

See infra Part II.B.1.
See infra Part I.B.1.
141
See infra Part I.B.2.
140
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academic freedom protects scholars’ participation in the Campaign. In
this regard, the Campaign is a seen as an expression of Campaigning
scholars’ opinions and should therefore be seen as legitimate.
Clearly, scholars may further personal, economic, or political
aspirations. However, academic freedom, as opposed to general
freedom of expression, is confined to the academic arena, teaching and
research, and the quest for truth. This idea is echoed in Jaspers’
understanding of the role of the university: “The university . . . is an
institution uniting people professionally dedicated to the quest and
transmission of truth . . . .”142 This quest for the truth must adhere to
professional standards, such as equality and meritocracy—all of which
are not answered by the Campaign. On the contrary, the Campaign is
designed to achieve a political goal that contradicts the essence of
academia.
2.

Academic Political Freedom

The analysis of academic political rights distinguishes between
two notions: the right to hold political opinions, and the right to be
actively engaged in politics. 143 Campaigning Scholars’ right to have
political opinions is undisputed. They could thus claim that they are
political activists addressing the wellbeing of nations and that their
political freedom permits disagreement with Israeli government
policy. This notion is echoed, to some extent, in Judge Danziger’s
minority opinion in Avneri, an Israeli case dealing with the
constitutionality of a legislation defining a call to boycott Israel as a
tort. A faculty person may certainly hold a political agenda and
exercise his political rights and act to achieve this goal. Therefore, all
higher-education teaching personnel should not be hindered or
impeded in exercising their civil rights as citizens, including the right
to contribute to social change through freely expressing their opinion
of state policies and of policies affecting higher education. 144
We do not doubt the right of a faculty person to hold political
opinions. A scholar may certainly support the Campaign as part of his
or her right to political opinions. Campaigners also have participatory

142

KARL JASPERS, THE IDEA OF THE UNIVERSITY 21 (1965).
See discussion supra Part I.B.2.(a)-(e).
144
HCJ 5239/11 Avneri v. Knesset OD (2015) (Isr.) (in Hebrew); see also Opinions
of the Supreme Court of Israel: A Project of Cardozo Law, supra note 122.
143
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political rights and may engage in parliamentary and similar political
activities outside the university. Furthermore, Campaigning Scholars
have the right to play a role in helping to identify and address issues
affecting the well-being of nations.145 However, we do question the
extent and relevance of such rights to be involved with the Campaign
within academia. The core question is whether these academic
political rights cover active participation in the Campaign, within
one’s academic professional capacity. This question will be examined
in the following subsections:
i.

Intramural v. Extramural Political
Activities

When dealing with academic political rights, there is an
important distinction between intramural (that is, held within the
boundaries of academy) and extramural activities (namely, outside the
walls of an academic institution). 146 The exercise of a faculty person’s
political rights must be outside of his or her employment. The
extramural political activity cannot interfere with educational roles and
duties.
Can Campaigners use institutional facilities and their academic
powers in order to further their political ideology? The very name or
brand of the “academic” Campaign (also referred to as the academic
boycott of Israel), is associated with the academic, rather than the
personal, extramural arena. The Campaign takes place within the
boundaries of the academic environment, and not in the scholar’s
private life. The Campaign includes firing from and not hiring to
academic positions, rejecting papers from journals, not inviting to
conferences, not writing recommendation letters for promotion, or not
shaking hands with Israeli faculty persons. All such manifestations are
not extramural events, but rather intramural.

145

World Declaration on Higher Education, supra note 13, at art. 2.
UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 8, at art. 30 (emphasis added) (“Highereducation teaching personnel have a right to undertake professional activities outside
of their employment, particularly those that enhance their professional skills or allow
for the application of knowledge to the problems of the community, provided such
activities do not interfere with their primary commitments to their home institutions
in accordance with institutional policies and regulations or national laws and
practice where they exist.”).
146
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Generally, an academic may employ his or her expertise to
“improve the world.” For example, writing a professional paper on a
political issue is a legitimate intramural professional activity. Yet,
every intramural activity must comply with institutional policies and
regulations147 and be subject to professional academic standards.
Conversely, the Campaign is exercised within the framework of
academic employment, as de facto it is manifested by the treatment of
fellow faculty, using the facilities, powers, and resources of the
university.148 This intramural activity does not adhere to academic
professional standards and is not covered by recognized academic
political rights.
Participating in the Campaign is a form of political activism
that does not further the goals of academia in disseminating
knowledge, as it hinders international cooperation and diversity. It
only helps in achieving the Campaigners’ personal objectives. Using
an academic institution to further one’s political agenda, rather than
the common good, is an abuse of power.
Academic activities taking place outside academic institutions,
such as in academic societies, require a more elaborate evaluation. We
hold that such activities do not fall categorically under intramural
activity, as they take place outside the confines of the university. We
maintain that there is a relationship between external academic
institutions supporting academic functions and intramural activities.
We further maintain that publishers, laboratory equipment
manufacturers, and academic associations are all academia related.
When faculty persons act outside their institution in a manner
negatively affecting their academic institution, their activity should be
regarded as intramural. For example, in our view, a nationality-based
dismissal of Israeli scholars effected by a faculty person, while holding
her position as Editor-In-Chief in a privately-owned academic journal,
amounts to extended intra-mural activity.

147

UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 8, at art. 30.
EINAV YOGEV AND GALLIA LINDENSTRAUSS, THE DELEGITIMIZATION
PHENOMENON: CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES, No. 169, at 15 (Sept. 2017).
148
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The Expression of Political Opinions

However, the sources discussed above149 demonstrate that
academic freedom does not serve as a safe harbor for political
activities. It is a shield and not a sword, used to gain influence on
matters not of academic concern. Teaching, researching, participating
in conferences, appertaining to a certain academic institution, and
holding opinions are all covered by academic freedom, but political
activism is not. Hence, we maintain that participating in the Campaign
is an expression of political opinion and activism that is not protected
fully covered by academic freedom.
We thus conclude that on the one hand, Israeli scholars’
academic freedom is infringed by the Campaign, and on the other
hand, Campaigning Scholars’ academic freedom does not entirely
cover their participation in the Campaign.
E.

Balancing Clashing Academic Rights and the
Campaign

The tension between the conflicting scholars’ rights manifested
in the Campaign concerns non-governmental actions performed by
“private” (non-State) actors, namely Israeli scholars and the
Campaigners. For instance, a Campaigning scholar might claim that
his academic freedom of expression allows him to use incivilities
against his fellow Israeli scholar. Conversely, the Israeli scholar might
claim that her right to academic freedom includes teaching in a proeducational and safe campus environment and that this right is thus
infringed by the incivilities.
In this Section, we investigate how to balance conflicting
academic rights with regard to the Campaign by applying the proposed
three balancing tests to the tension manifested by the Campaign. 150
We will start by applying the relevance test, move on to apply the
“seclusive” v. “exclusionary” exercise of rights test and finally, the
virtue test.

149
150

See discussion supra Part I.B.2.(b), (c), (e).
See infra Part I.C.4.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2022

41

Touro Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 1 [2022], Art. 7

162

TOURO LAW REVIEW
1.

Vol. 38

The Relevance Test

The relevance test that was suggested above examines the
proximity of the activities in question to academia. According to this
test, the closer in nature the activity is to academia, the greater its
weight. However, we maintain that the nature of the Campaign is not
close to academia. It is rather antithetical to academia. The term
“Academic Campaign” is actually an oxymoron. It does not aim at the
truth but rather has a political goal. The Campaign’s mission is not
about benefiting the general public or students, but rather political
entities, namely the B.D.S. Movement. The Campaign does not adhere
to professional standards, but rather advances bigotry and
discrimination, as it distinguishes between scholars basing on their
nationality by forwarding a different attitude towards scholars of
Israeli nationality. It does not advance education, as it calls to boycott
and sanction academic institutions.
2.

“Seclusive” v. “Exclusionary” Exercise of
Rights and the Campaign

The second suggested test for balancing clashing academic
rights examines the mode of realization of academic freedoms.
According to this test, a seclusive exercise of a right, namely one that
does not harm others, outweighs an exclusionary one, as the liberty of
one cannot come at the expense of the other.
The application of the seclusive exercise of rights overriding
exclusionary exercise of rights is relevant to the Campaign. On the
one hand, Israeli scholars usually exercise their academic freedom in
a seclusive manner. They teach, lecture, write, and research, but they
do not personally breach the rights of others. On the other hand,
Campaigners’ rights are exercised in an exclusionary manner,
interfering with their peers’ rights. Dismissing a person from an
editorial board for being Israeli is not an act of liberty—it is academic
tyranny. This notion is represented in Figure 3.
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Figure 3.

Campaigners' rights override the circle representing Israeli Scholars'
rights, resulting in an unjustified breach of academic freedom. It
seems to us that generally, while Israeli scholars exercise their
academic freedom in a seclusive way, Campaigners interfere with their
peers’ rights. In Lincoln’s words: “Here are two . . . incompatible
things, called by the same name—liberty. And it follows that each of
the things is, by the respective parties, called by two different and
incompatible names—liberty and tyranny.”151
3.

The Virtue Analysis of Clashing Academic
Freedoms

The third suggested test for balancing clashing academic
freedoms is the virtue test. According to this test, increased weight
should be attached to the exercise of academic freedom that enhances
humanistic, liberal, and democratic values, as opposed to racist or
totalitarian aspirations. Applying the virtue test to the Campaign's
activities, we conclude that the Campaign “cannot be pursued by
means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end
can be more narrowly achieved.”152 We hold that the exercise of
151

Abraham Lincoln, Address at Sanitary Fair, Baltimore, Maryland, in 7
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 301, 302 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953)
(1864).
152
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 602 (1967) (quoting Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).
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Israeli scholars’ and Campaigners’ rights is not equivalent in virtue in
all matters that relate to the Campaign. While the purely academic
nature of the teaching and research of Israeli scholars is undisputed,
Campaigning scholars apply a discriminatory agenda, that is based on
peers’ nationality, rather than equality. Moreover, this agenda is
related to the B.D.S. movement that has dubious ties to terror.
4.

The Balancing Tests Applied to the
Campaign- Conclusions

Applying the suggested balancing tests to the Campaign, we
conclude that the Campaign obstructs Israeli scholars’ academic
freedom, and that in many instances, academic freedom does not fully
protect involvement within the Campaign. On the one hand, Israeli
academics’ teaching and research activities are strictly relevant to
academia, they are performed in a seclusive manner, namely not
breaching fellow scholars’ rights, and they adhere to democratic
values. On the other hand, Campaigners’ rights are exercised in an
exclusionary manner, interfering with their peers’ rights to academic
expression and meritocratic inclusion. Therefore, Israeli scholars’
academic freedom should take precedence over conflicting rights in
participating in the Campaign.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Scholars’ academic freedom is composed of two pillars. First,
inclusion—requiring capacity, equality, and the provision of a proeducational academic environment. Second, academic expression—
referring to teaching and research, freedom of opinion, political
participation outside academia, and freedom to receive academic
materials. Academic freedom is limited by professional standards and
the respect of fellow scholars. It is generally confined to academia
and applies intramurally. Scholars’ academic freedom serves as a
shield from undue interference of numerous entities: state, students,
academic institutions, political, religious and economic entities, and
fellow scholars. In order to deal with conflicting scholars’ rights to
academic freedom, we have proposed three tests: the relevance test,
the “seclusive” v. “exclusionary” exercise of rights test, and the virtue
test.
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These conclusions can be applied to the Campaign. The
Campaign against Israeli academia has opened the door to a whole new
level of assault on academic freedom. There are those who desire to
force their political take on all members of academia. The result is the
attempt to create a one-stop-shop instead of a marketplace of ideas to
which scholars of all nationalities are invited.
De facto, the differentiating standards that are incorporated
against Israeli scholars lead to the conclusion that the Campaign
conditions admission to academia on a nationality-basis rather than on
merit, turning academia into a nationality-based forum. In a
metaphoric way, it could be thus concluded that the Campaign requires
an entrance “visa” to academia and turns Campaigners into passport
controllers. Where academic freedom is restricted or limited, a
researchers’ ability to produce and employ knowledge is impeded.
The Campaign creates an atmosphere of fear and mistrust, functioning
as a barrier to academic inclusion. Further, the Campaign brings about
a breach of scholars’ right to expression in research and teaching and
their right to hold political opinions.
Campaigners’ academic freedom is confined to the academic
arena and cannot serve as a safe harbor for political activities that
contradict the very essence of academia. Campaigning scholars may
certainly engage in political activities using their knowledge to
“improve the world” if they meet academic standards. However, this
right comes with responsibilities. The Campaign does not further the
goals of academia in disseminating knowledge, as it hinders
international cooperation and diversity. It only helps in achieving the
Campaigners’ personal objectives. Hence, using an academic
institution to further one’s political agenda, rather than the common
good, is an abuse of power.
It could be claimed that the Campaign gives rise to two
clashing academic freedoms: the Campaigners’ and Israelis’. The
paper has suggested three normative tests for balancing and
prioritizing them and reached the conclusion that the Campaign should
be given lesser weight than the strict academic activities of Israeli
scholars. In applying the relevance test, we have asserted that the
Campaign is hardly academically related. Additionally, while Israeli
scholars exercise their academic freedom in a seclusive way,
Campaigners interfere with their peers’ rights. When applying the
virtue test, the right to equality takes priority over discriminatory
political academic rights.
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